some extent. For immediate use, water is dipped into one of a number of quart jugs, an unfired cream-coloured vessel with a wide body, a long narrow neck, and a flaring mouth, turned on the wheel and imported commercially from Mosul. For further cleansing, a piece of cheesecloth is often tied over the mouth of these jugs. Glass tumblers are used to serve water, and, if it is offered to a number of guests, it is necessary that the glass be cleaned after each person has used it. This is done by pouring out a little from the jug, circulating it in the glass, and tossing it on the earthen floor or into the courtyard. The water in the basin is not used for drinking, but for a variety of other purposes, washing cooking utensils and dishes, bathing infants, laundry, and so on.

It is interesting that the public bath, the hammam, so much a feature of life in Medieval and Ottoman times, has largely disappeared in modern Kurdistan.[1] Bathing in Rowanduz is confined to private homes, and there is no place in the town, including the khan or hotel, where a person might obtain bathing facilities for a price. The larger houses contain a closet or a small room for this purpose, and the bather is furnished with a bucket or jar of water which he pours over himself with a dipper of some sort, usually a tin can. Waste runs out through a drain in the floor. Toilet facilities are also to be found in

[1] Mazaheri, 1951, p. 175.

Iraq, and that which is European. It need not be thought 291
that the Kurdish element is something wholly unique, for [178]
there is an abundance of evidence, for example, almost any
Persian miniature painting, to indicate that colourful dyes,
if not the styles themselves, had a greater province in
centuries gone by than are in evidence today, a change
bound up in the impoverishment of the area and coupled
with the impact of European civilization.

Turning first to the Kurdish townsman of Rowanduz,
dressed in native clothing, the basic undergarment is a
pair of baggy, white cotton drawers, bound at the waist
by a draw-string, which fall a few inches below the knees.
A cotton undershirt may or may not be worn, and the next
mandatory item is a white cotton shirt without a collar,
closed at the neck by a series of round cloth buttons.
The salient characteristic of this shirt is its sleeve which
extends almost a foot beyond the wrist and is split to the
elbow. When a jacket is worn, this long end is turned
back and tied around the forearm, just below the elbow.
For washing, or for fighting, the two ends are tied to- [515] [579]
gether behind the neck, drawing up the sleeves of both
shirt and jacket above the elbows. A sleeveless vest,
of European style and fastened with a number of buttons,
is often worn over the shirt. Its fabric is either
identical with the jacket or of striped cotton, but it
is not exposed to view in outdoor attire.

The outer garments consist of trousers and jacket,

to let Mahmud Beg know of their presence and visit his 622
diwankhana, or he will think they look down on his hospital- 574
ity, or, worse, do not know him or recognize him as a chieftain."

Save for the question of hospitality, it may be seen 423
from the section on administration that the government 648
takes a strong interest in chieftains' activities. The state lays claim to all unregistered land, amiriya, which includes a large amount of "tribal" and village territory, and would prefer to collect taxes directly from the producers, thus cutting off the most important source of aristocratic revenue. Some of the chieftains, abreast of the times, have attempted to have tribal lands registered in their own names. The execution of the law belongs to 648
the government, either the civil code of the judge or the 642
tribal code of the qaimmaqam. Vengeance is also of the [692]
state, and homicides are to be handled by the police and the courts, rather than the vendetta. Safeguard and sanctuary in a well-policed district are thought to be unnecessary. Modern Iraq is in concept democratic, and [554]
such titles as agha, beg, or shaykh, while they are widely used, do not enjoy the sanction of law. The army and the constabulary are thought adequate to handle military exigencies, and the arming of a populace, particularly parties of bodyguards, is considered superfluous, if not dangerous. Thus the Kurdish aristocracy has lost many of 565
its important functions and perogatives. They are no longer 178
leaders in war or administrators, and much of their

economic wealth has been cut from beneath them. In an ideal situation, they may survive only as landowners and as they are able to obtain positions in the government. The situation, however, is far from ideal, and in practice many continue as their forebears, side by side with the new competitors. It cannot be denied that they accord the government considerable aid in the maintenance of order, and, at the same time, provide it with great anxiety in their private warfare and political thought. 565 [178]

This Kurdish aristocracy is by no means feeble in the face of such competition, and has the advantage of popular support and sympathy, particularly, as has been seen, because it represents a highly idealized group. It has been said that the Kurds are easy prey to doctrinaire philosophies, specifically Communism, but among them, save in certain of the well-educated, there is no knowledge or sign of what may be called a "class struggle," or, in older terms, the rich or priveleged against the poor. The struggle is strictly between Kurdish society as a whole and what they consider an alien system. The investigator has talked at length with a number of dissatisfied Kurdish youths, as well as others in whom such sentiments might be expected, and has heard much of "good" chieftains and "bad" chieftains, but never the aristocracy condemned as such. It must not be thought that the speech of this aristocratic group is "reactionary," in the sense of opposition to modern innovations and the desire to return to older ways. Such things as automobiles, modern firearms, wirelesses, and 565 668 177 186

any technical device within their means have been assimilated with alacrity. European and American medical goods are eagerly sought, and there is almost a childlike faith in the wonders of the Western World. "We can," said an agha, "make of this area a Switzerland of the Middle East." The less well-informed, whose knowledge only extends to the Mediterranean, say the same thing, having reference to Lebanon. Insofar as family life is concerned, the Kurds, comparing themselves to the Arabs, point with pride to their "more enlightened" treatment of women in terms of the veil and social intercourse, but one is dubious of any wider extent of this liberality. In short, the Kurdish aristocracy represents an extremely active class, untroubled by most aspects of Westernization, but weakened by their own dissentions and threatened by the encroachment of a new government. It seems impossible, in view of so many variables, to predict whether or not they will be able to maintain their integrity.

Inasmuch as they represent the first system in which the only significant division is between aristocrat and commoner, the Kurdish chieftains of the Rowanduz area are often uneducated and wear the national costume as it has been described in the preceding section. Only a moderate number from this group have obtained higher education and have subsequently entered the government service. Many, indeed, are illiterate and have no knowledge of Arabic, the language of the government. In Rowanduz only three aristocratic houses are represented, those of Isma'il

or marriage, have their focus in that place, rather than in the town. It is interesting that this class, which regards itself as "modern" and "progressive," should reinforce things held to be reactionary by some of the townspeople, specifically the absolute segregation of women. Even a radically-minded official would not dare to let his wife have the same freedom in the town she can enjoy in Baghdad or some other city. The townspeople often commented on the peculiar behavior of the medical officer who kept his wife in the greatest seclusion, although those who had caught a glimpse of her said she was no particular beauty. This segregation on the part of the officials and officers has an automatic effect on the townspeople of greater wealth who do the same to their own wives and daughters where otherwise they might have permitted them greater liberty. 565 593 [184]

The primary task of this section has been to present an analysis of the family life of the average townsman, and it is important to notice that the family does not seem to constitute an important area of change in the transformation of the culture. Ra'uf Effendi, like so many elders, remarked that the society of the town had changed for the worse from Ottoman days, but, on going over all of the affairs of the family, he was only able to conclude that "youth had greater respect for age" fifty years ago. In spite of this observation, the family in Rowandus is still a distinctly patriarchal organization and its members are 593 [121] [178] [888]

3: Barth E-5 (1951) 1954 MA11 Kurd MA11

and in the same area possibly also among some Caucasian groups.[4] However, though marriage patterns do not function to define the relations between lineages, this does not assume that marriage relations and maternal ties have indeed no relevance of a structural or specifically political nature. The present paper presents an hypothesis regarding these implications in the Kurdish lineage organization, specifically the meaning of a pattern of father's brother's daughter marriage, for the consideration of students working with similar problems in the Middle East.

Features of Kurdish culture and society have been described elsewhere,[5] but might be summarized briefly. The Kurds are a linguistic and ethnic group, nearly exclusively Moslem by religion, totalling some three million people.[6] They occupy a semi-continuous territory along the hills and mountains east and north of the Fertile Crescent, divided between the modern states of Persia, Iraq, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Syria. Some few groups of Kurds have remained nomadic till the present day, following their herds of sheep, goats, and large cattle into the mountains in the summer and down on the plains in the winter. The great majority are today subsistence farmers, many of whom practice a pattern of localized transhumance. The present discussion relates to the southern districts of Iraq Kurdistan, where material was collected in the field from February to August, 1951.

Two basic types of organization were found: a tribal system, based on descent, and a feudal system, based on class and land ownership. The latter is progressively becoming assimilated into the modern structure of the state of Iraq; the former, a patrilineal lineage system, survives only among the nomads and a minority of the farmers in the more isolated territories.

Kurdish tribal organization is a segmentary lineage organization of very simple type. The largest kinship unit, the *tira*, is a maximal lineage, divisible into segments according to the charter of patrilineal descent. The genealogical depth of the tira varies. For the sedentary Hamawands (location: Kirkuk Liwa, Iraq), the apical ancestor is nine generations removed from the present adult generation; for the nomadic Wurda Shatri (location: centering in Suleimani Liwa, Iraq), twelve generations.

Several tiras may be united, though not necessarily, in a political confederacy of variable endurance, the most important in southern Kurdistan being at present

4 Louis J. Luzbetak, *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia* (Vienna, 1951).

5 V. F. Minorsky, "Kurds and Kurdistan" (in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, London, 1913); E. R. Leach, *Social and Economic Organization of the Rowanduz Kurds* (Monographs in Social Anthropology, no. 3, London, 1940); Frederik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan* (Universitetets Etnografiske Museum, Bulletin no. 7, Oslo, 1953).

6 *The Middle East* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1950).

369 512 representatives of the "uneducated" urban women, as little as it did that of the women in the villages, but was difficult to reconcile with the form of life of the fully and half-grown schoolgoing children. In fact a continual conflict existed between the original, nomad type of life in the house, and the demand for fixed habits, fixed furnishing, necessary for the educated section of the family.

342 178 As an example of a new home intended solely for an educated urban woman we can take one created by a young newly-married couple, both folkschool teachers. It was a miniature edition of my interpreter's home: hall or loggia, with a room for the reception of guests behind. Entrance to the bedroom was gained from the loggia, and thence to the storeroom. In front of these rooms was a court with a cooking pit in the one corner and a pump in the centre. By the street wall there was a latrine in the [364] form of a locked room. The bathroom in the neighbouring house could be used. There was no electric light. The guest room boasted steel furniture, and the loggia mattresses to sit on were also intended [352] for sleeping on on the roof. The bedroom was furnished with a Baghdad suite consisting of a double- [513] bed, wardrobe and dressing table made of polished wood. When this educated couple's home was arranged at the time of marriage there was furniture in all rooms. If this home be compared with others where similar furniture had previously been found, it appeared that in the course of time, as the family increases, the flexible mode of life results in the dissolution of regular furnishing. This had apparently been the case at the home of my interpreter, where the original marriage bed had been moved up to the roof for the changing use of the various members of the family, whilst the wardrobe, filled with bundles, was left in solitary majesty. When planning the wedding of the grown-up [591] son in my interpreter's home, where the couple was to live in the home of the bridegroom's father as members of an extended family, it was decided that the room where the family wardrobe stood and which during the time I lived there had no other furniture, should be given to the young couple. The daughter-in-law would probably acquire a Baghdad bedroom suite as part of her bride wealth. As the young couple, after having been an independent family cell would, after the birth of the first [593] child, divide—the woman entering the woman's world of the house, the man the man's world outside it—the furnishings would be included in the common, flexible, movable pattern.

[592] The only possible solution of the problem of housing so large a number of family members in a home with relatively so few rooms, is to use them in common both for meals and for sleeping. It



Fig. 31. (Cf. figg. 24 and 30). Ground-plan of house for newly-married couple. Sulaimani. Scale 1:200.
a: central living room, *hrywa*; b: sleeping room; c: store room; d: cooking and baking facilities in courtyard; e: (*hammām*) ÷; f: latrine; g: guest room.

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

appeared more important than the private life of the individual or the married couple that a reception room for male guests should be maintained in such wise that they could come and go without being seen by the women of the house.

WOMAN'S ACTIVITIES IN THE HOME

The activities of Kurdish women comprise the following eleven categories: Baking of bread, treatment of milk, making of tea, cooking, fetching water, collecting fuel, treatment of grain, washing up, washing and ironing of clothes, cleaning the house, and making beds. They rise at about 5 a.m., relax or sleep during the middle of the day, and go to bed between 11 and midnight.

Baking of bread. Kurdish bread consists of circular pancakes, *nân*, of the thinness of paper, about 50 cm. in diameter, crisp when new, so soft later that it almost resembles wash leather[31]. The dough, *hawîr*, is prepared from wheat flour, *ârd*, sifted through a round sieve, water, *âw*, and salt, *xwê*. It is kept in a sack or bag, *xûe-dân*,[32] of knotted or woven material (E. 2357). Yeast is not used, and when the dough is prepared it is immediately ready for use. It is kneaded in a large, flat, circular copper dish tinned on the inside, with an edge about 10 cm. high. The dough is loosened from the dish by the help of a flat iron spoon, (E. 2265) about 23 cm. long, the handle of which ends in a loop. The dough is formed by hand into lumps, *gumek*, about the size of a clenched fist, which are laid out, often on a plastic cloth, for later use. The forming of the dough is done in two ways; the one chosen depending, so far as I could discover, on whether the baking was to be done in a jar-shaped earth

Fig. 32. Baking. Dough sheet is placed upon baking pillow. Topzawa.
Fig. 33. Baking. Dough is rolled out upon baking table. Topzawa.

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

857 562 summer holidays. During their stay at home in the village they led the life of adult men, that is to say they spent most of the day outside the home in company with those of their own age. They used at night the iron beds, and they slept late in the mornings. The only obligation resting on the sons of the house was the waiting upon any male guests who might be in the guest house, to whom they had to bring tea and food prepared by the women within the area of the family residence.

883 178 The elder of these two sons, aged 18, worked as a mechanic with the European engineers at the Dokan Dam Site, which resulted in an irreparable breach in his pattern of behaviour, the structure of which lost its inner coherence. As the leading young man of the village, he left the sheikh's farm every morning on horseback. The other hands from Topzawa and Rikawa covered on foot the distance between their villages and the Site (nearly an hour's walk, only trying in great summer heat). At the Dokan Dam Site he then was submerged among the other unskilled Kurdish labourers, a dirty little mechanic in overalls, resuming his inherited glory and distinction only when he rode back up the side of the mountain to his father's home. Here his 12 year old half-sister took charge of the horse, unsaddled it, put it out to grass, and then brought water to her half-brother for a thorough wash, if this was performed on the clay terrace outside the central room and not at the garden basin.

Despite the young man's admiration of the French group among the European engineers with whom he had most to do, and a flirtation at a distance with one of the English girls, he gradually abandoned the selling of his hours, for he only received money which was of no interest whatever in the aristocratic village milieu, but he never succeeded in being accepted by the foreigners, a thing he had desperately hoped for. He was a typical example of the results of an old pattern of life, with its firmly fixed scale of values, being dissolved under European influence without anything of equal value being substituted in its stead.

883 562 868 The girls in a humble village environment, like those in the aristocratic, took part in domestic activities which also comprised the fetching of water, often from far away, and milking out in the mountains. Small girls were always seen with smaller children on their backs, whom they helped with anything there was to do, and washed in the nearest watercourse if any accident occurred. Girls in the villages knew nothing of schools, but they grew up fully trained in their future duties as wives and mothers.

883 [872] For that matter schooling did not enter into the life pattern of boys either among ordinary peasants in the villages. On the other hand their labour was much utilised in agriculture. They watched the sheep and goats. They fetched grass from the mountains as fodder, equipped with sacks and sickles. They helped in the field work and took the plough, which could be dismantled, from one field to another, up and down the hill side. By this participation in adult agricultural work they, like the girls, obtained a training which stood them in good stead later in life.

883 369 In the third and fourth environments, the educated and uneducated urban milieus, school-going was customary for both boys and girls.

872 An elementary school scheme exists in Southern Kurdistan consisting of a 6 year primary and 5 year secondary school. The latter is divided into a 3 year intermediate and a 2 year preparatory school with possibilities of transferring to a 4 year higher college. The school age is 7, and since 1940 6 years primary schooling is obligatory when possible.

593 198 absent of the daughters is removed from the home, an inhuman labour is involved for the wives remaining behind. The distribution of work between the various generations of women in the home, where the younger waited on the elder, is thus destroyed and replaced by its converse. Also dissolved is the stable family hierarchy still to be found in the villages, where the children from quite a young age take their due places, their duties increasing with age, a system based on the serving of the elder by the younger, the boys by the girls.

858 Bishop[77] says that it is regrettable that Iranian children have no childhood. Longrigg and Stoakes[78] remark that childhood in Iran is no definite age, but rather a matter of whether or not one is regarded as adult. Accordingly, the time until the child became a small adult with responsibility was made as short as possible.

080 In my opinion our culture and form of schooling places a far heavier burden on our children than is the case among the Kurds. We isolate children from adults, both in regard to work and leisure, in order that later they shall be able to honour the big demands made upon them by an industrialised society. As a result the home becomes a type of service station, where everything is arranged for the child to be able to attend to its schooling as well as possible in order to be equipped for the severe competition facing it later on. The home does not become a place where the child becomes a member of a small community, possessing its definite position and duties, which gives a far earlier and greater maturity than that provided by any amount of school attendance.

871 182 Among the Kurds it also appeared as though schooling was doing away with piety, and the younger generation in Sulaimani seemed to regard religion and what goes with it from an historical angle. None of the school-taught young men or women took part in daily prayers. Islam's heavy religious demands on daily life would seem to be incompatible with attendance at school. But what can be

The position of the child in and outside the home.

[857] [369] [565] [562]

Activities	I Village Aristocracy		II Peasants		III Educated milieu		IV Uneducated milieu	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Work at home	×		×		×		×	
Work outside home			×	×				
Schooling		×			×	×	×	×
Street life		×		×		×		×

Common to girls in all four female environments is assistance in the house according to age, whereby the girl acquires the necessary training in domestic activities. For the bigger girls also the charge of their smaller brothers and sisters, thus obtaining the required knowledge of child care.

In the case of girls of the humble village milieu, also help to the adult women in work outside the home, milking, fetching of water etc. For girls in an urban milieu, both educated and uneducated, also school attendance.

The common feature of the boys training is the "street education", life with men outside the home. In a village milieu they take part in the men's agricultural activities, particularly the guarding of sheep and goats and the collection of fodder. In an aristocratic village milieu the boys are sent away to school in towns like Sulaimani and Kirkuk. In the two urban environments the boys attend local schools. Among the peasants the boy only attends school should there be a preparatory school in the village, and to the extent that his work in the fields can be dispensed with.

4: Hanaen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

Sure 24, verses 30-31 [11]. of the Coran are usually considered to form the religious basis for the complete veiling practised by Muslim women, supplemented by the recommendation, contained in Sure 33, verse 59, that the wives and daughters of the Faithful put on an over-garment when leaving the house in order that they shall be recognised as honest women. Sure 24, verses 30–31 runs: ("Say to the believing men that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts; that is purer for them; surely *Allāh* is aware of what they do). And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts and not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let them wear their headcoverings over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or those whom their right hands possess, or the male servants not having need (of women), or the children who have not attained knowledge of what is hidden of women; and let them not strike their feet so that what they hide of their ornaments may be known; and turn to *Allāh* all of you, O believers! so that you may be successful"[12].

It is maintained that the veiling of women was originally foreign to the Arabs and the prophet Muhammed[13], having been adopted by Islam after the prophet's death in 632 during the years of expansion in Syria and Mesopotamia. Here contact was made with the Hellenic-Byzantine empire where women led a secluded life, a custom preserved from ancient Greece. The veil was adopted as a mark of respectability as opposed to harlotry, and veiling was further extended, justifying this by reference to the two mentioned Sures of the Coran. By obtaining religious backing the veil and shawl or cowl, though varying somewhat in the different Islamic areas, became something quite different from any other clothing. It became a symbol of a religious idea and of a definite pattern of behaviour. By its anonymity, it gave women a liberty that no other dress could provide. It aroused a respect that can only be compared with that shown to a nun's habit. Unknown and unrecognisable, she in that dress represented something inviolate and protected. No man could demand to see the face hidden by the veil. Unseen, she was not only herself but also represented half the community, and in virtue of this she could demand consideration and the maintenance of certain privileges. She herself was able to see the one to whom she was speaking, but the reverse was not the case. Woodsmall[14] quotes various statements made by women who had been accustomed to wear, or still wore, the veil. An Islamic woman from Alexandria says: "A veil ... presents strange paradoxes. It is a restrictive emphasis on sex relationship, and also on moral protection; a sign of utter dependence and also of freedom from responsibility; a handicap to real progress and a symbol of special privilege. In a word the veil represents an entirely different social system. Discarding it, therefore, involves a whole change of psychology impossible for a Western woman to understand ... so entirely foreign to you and so much a part of us ...".

Over-garment and veil were in use in all four feminine environments in Southern Kurdistan, but to very different extents. The women of the village aristocracy did not wear them in daily life, but only when visiting a town (see p. 76). They then wore them from the moment of leaving home until they returned. For the women it was thus a sign that they were leaving a village milieu to enter an urban environment. The same applied to women of the humble village milieu. "Many times in the city at Sulaimani I have been addressed by closely-veiled women, who, when they raised the veil, proved to

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11
Yugoslavia EF1

middle of the last century. Within her seclusion the Kurdish woman, like other Islamic women, is assured by the law and by the Coran of rights quite other than those accorded Western women prior to their emancipation[30]. Kurdish women were not suppressed. Even the humble village women were no more suppressed than any woman in a peasant community could be when the biggest share of the work falls to her lot. It was a physically, not a legally, inferior status.

Nor are there any grounds for talking about lack of equal rights because men and women in Kurdistan each have their own pattern of life. One might as well say that a man had not the same rights as a woman because he was unable to follow her pattern of life. The world of men and women were simply divided, more or less (mostly more) from the cradle to the grave. One can therefore talk of an existing justification for this division, with a deviation in favour of the man within the humble village milieu, and in favour of the woman in the educated urban milieu.

ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE KURDISH WOMAN'S CULTURAL PATTERN IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMING "EMANCIPATION"

It is a fact that the Kurdish Muslim area, like other Muslim territories, is on the threshold of a transformation. The introduction of the necessary industrialisation to improve the material side of this technically-underdeveloped country was, in 1957, practically on the doorstep. Even though these changes in the structure of society will last reach the Kurds, that political minority in mountains difficult of access, the years ahead will also bring this area into the melting pot.

In conclusion, therefore, a glance must be cast on the culture pattern of the Kurdish woman, a culture sentenced, if not to death, at all events to radical change, and some of the conditions existing in 1957 are judged in their relation to coming reconstruction. As mentioned in the introduction, I had in the person of my interpreter, an example of the most "advanced" feminine type among the Kurdish women studied. When placing the word "advanced" in inverted commas I do so advisedly.

As a rule one overlooks the fact that cultures older than our own, despite the lack of our Western technical facilities, may in other directions represent a more advanced culture stage, and that a change caused by bitter economic necessity so far from representing progress may, on the contrary, well have to be paid for by retrogression in other spheres. At first sight the introduction of the Western woman's form of life is regarded as being of direct benefit to women with foreign culture patterns. It thus seems surprising that the abolition of the veil, the dropping of seclusion and so forth meets with opposition from women at some places. A few examples of this can be quoted.

In the Muslim areas of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the veil was abolished by Marshal Tito in 1952. Two years later, when visiting these provinces, I was told that it cost a woman three months' imprisonment to retain the black veil and chequered over-garment which, with variants, I

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11
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He writes[36]: "As an excuse for the ban [of the wearing of veil and over-garments] the reformers stated that dangerous criminals and adherents of l'ancien régime all too easily could hide themselves under the long, armless "feradje", the black "tarshaf", and the flimsy "yashmak", transparent only from inside, which naturally afforded the best security against search, and it is an undoubted fact that many a spy and criminal has concealed himself under this woman's dress, that veils and hides all forms". Rygaard likewise stresses[37] that "... the so-called emancipation of the Turkish women is regarded with some justification by many Turks as being an abandonment of a natural protection, and that the Turkish desire to guard his women strictly in the home must be viewed as a symptom of modesty and not be credited to the very widespread, but erroneous, impression that he jealously wishes to hide strictly private mistresses in his harem under the most humiliating conditions".

Should one wish to learn about conditions in these Turkish harems prior to Kemal Atatürk's day, one can hardly do better than to apply to the women themselves. We have an account of conditions under the Sultanate just before the first World War, written by an Arab Sherifa, Musbah Haidar. As daughter of a brother of the Sherif of Mecca, who dwelt in a castle on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus, as the "guest" of the Sultan of Turkey, and with an English mother, she gives in her memoirs (published 1948) a woman's assessment of life in an Arab-Turkish upper-class home. Musbah Haidar[38] speaks about: "... those well-guarded, exclusive and dignified homes—the harems". Regarding the beginnings of the transformation of the Oriental women's life in Turkey to a Western pattern, she writes: "With the rapid decline of old courtesies, breeding and old customs, all that the women got in their place was the doubtful liberty of being able to go out when and where they liked, instead of being guarded and protected as they always have been, always attended and back in their homes by sunset". Incidentally, she strongly denounces the descriptions that have appeared in book form or in articles that purport to provide an authentic picture of the life of a Muslim woman in Turkey. "... In all the years which Musbah spent in Turkey, never did she see Europeans being either allowed or accepted into the Imperial circle, or those of other great houses. Great Eastern ladies were not in the habit of receiving inquisitive and curious foreigners. If occasionally an Ambassador's wife or that of a Consul-General was permitted to visit the Harem, it was done most ceremoniously, and no lady present ever relaxed her polite and formal hospitality into intimate friendship. So these so-called intrepid travellers and globetrotting journalists could only pick up their impressions and ideas from some ninth-rate Levantine, or from some self-styled and much advertised "Hanoum"[39].

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It was symptomatic that in Iraqi Kurdistan it was among the young men[40] and not among the women that I met a definite wish for a change of existing conditions. It was among the young men who had studied at the University of Beirut, or who had been trained in Europe or America, that one heard talk of, as an ideal for the future, "an educated wife" and monogamy. The right people in the West are most inclined to envy, the Coran's sanction of polygamy, was apparently not a right they wished to avail themselves of in the future. From what I saw of the man's position in the home, particularly within the uneducated urban feminine milieu, it was understandable that a man could

dream of not having to face a united woman's front of, say, mother, when harshly charged by the women of his family, plus sisters, daughters half and fully grown, who ordered his life from start to finish. In an "educated wife" he hoped to obtain compensation for the social and emotional contact he was now forced to seek during the hours of day with other men.

This leads us to a discussion of the Islamic, and thus the Kurdish woman's married position and the marriages arranged by the family. As already mentioned, the choice of a young man's married partner is practically always left to the women of his family, that is to say the mother or step-mother and sisters, whereafter the matter is laid before the father for approval. In regard to the fact that married couples in many cases have never seen each other before the marriage is to be consummated, the general Western idea is that it must be difficult for a young girl to be given to an unknown man. However, it must be equally trying for the young man. This is also pointed to by Granquist when she says[8]: "In what concerns a woman's lack of freedom in her marriage the same thing holds good to a great extent of the young man".

It was characteristic that the brother of Sheikh Taffir in Tegnawa, who was thinking of going to Europe, asked me if it really was true that one could walk up to any woman in the street and offer her marriage. That was his first impression of liberty of choice in Europe, [he had never envisaged] any sentimental basis for marriage.

The young woman is thus selected by the women with whom she will have to live and work, as the young couple usually dwells in the bridegroom's home. Her moral beforehand [and highly-prized] by the bride price paid out on the contraction of marriage, which is expended to a greater or lesser degree on the luxury with which she is to be surrounded. In most cases she knows the women who are to be her daily companions and fellow-workers. From her own home she is well trained in the domestic work that can be expected of her. She has been brought up with the quite natural idea that her most important destiny and greatest happiness is to be allowed to bear children. From the years spent in the house among other women she has heard and witnessed everything worth knowing about the difficulties of matrimonial relations. She is not expected to be her husband's comrade on a spiritual or intellectual level. The basis for the joint family idea, with several generations housed within the [the same building] is a married life of a different nature, less organized than in our culture pattern. During the day the husband, even among the village aristocracy, has little opportunity of companionship with his wife, as the great boundary between the lives of life of men and women compelled him to seek the society of other men, whilst on her side the woman enters the feminine half of the community. On entering marriage, a young woman, in addition to her own personal qualities, is regarded as a representative of a whole family, with which it has been felt desirable to become allied. She arrives in no more of her own family's glory. She herself had no personal expectations beyond the advantages to be derived from the married state and the fulfilment of a woman's natural desire to have children. As young people in good families had not seen much other before marriage, it was obvious that no sentimental basis existed on which to meet the union, but this did not mean that love on a high degree of sympathy might not develop between husband and wife and that this was quite

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With the introduction of monogamous marriage and divorce that not only gets rid of the wife, but also dissolves the children's home, a [phenomenon hitherto unknown will arise in Kurdistan and other Islamic areas that are copying our pattern of culture, the solitary mother: on the one hand the solitary divorced mother, and on the other, the result of women's entry into the labour market, the solitary unmarried mother.

Although it has been maintained from several quarters[1] that the veil and seclusion, women's subordinate social position, were originally foreign to the Arabs and to Mohammed, and were first adopted by Islam when the Arabs came into contact with the Greek-Hellenic, Byzantine culture, the fact remains that this related status obtained religious sanction from Sure 24, verse 31 of the Koran. Consequently, the veil and seclusion are as much a religious as a secular matter. The law of Islam don't's, goes far deeper than does Roman law. The ordinances of the Koran, the whole fiqh system, comprises every detail of existence, and constitutes a practical guide, a pattern of behaviour[2]. The restrictions resulting therefrom were maintained by Kurdish women in Iraq with the greatest seriousness, respect and care in all four feminine milieus.

In general, attention has been paid to the fact that women in Muslim homes where seclusion was maintained to a greater or lesser degree, were confined to certain parts of the home. There is therefore reason to point out that the men may equally well be said to be excluded from the women's apartments of all the other homes he may visit. In Kurdish villages only the guest room, a part of the squire's house, was open to him. In towns he was permitted to enter the guest room (without a glance at the courtyard) and to leave the house again just as discreetly. The core of the home was the forbidden area; the women there were the people he was not allowed to see. From the time a boy passed a certain age, a wall was suddenly raised between him and the women's world; he was shut out and relegated to the society of other men and the streets. The women belonging to his own home formed an exception.

The bazar, your offices and public offices I visited were as gloomy and dissolute as harangles. A chair at a street corner or a tea house bench was the womanless world to which a male was relegated on reaching manhood. It seemed to me that the men in their male world did not thrive as much as did the women and children in their half of society. Somehow or other the women seemed to have discovered a more lively and friendly social connection between themselves than had the men, or, for that matter, than we have in the West. Under cover of the veil women were able to move about in the men's world. Outside the home their world was not devoid of men to the same extent that the men's world was devoid of women. Even though women were veiled in the street they were able to see. In many cases they were also able to talk, trade and bargain with men in the city, in banks and in your offices. They could see whom they were addressing; men are only a black veil.

In view of the great part that conformance with the rules of Islam played in the life of Kurdish women, her positive attitude to the five pillars of Islam (see chapter V), any change in her life pattern in this quarter would involve a complete transformation. It is not surprising that the altered life of women in Turkey has had to proceed hand in hand with a emotional offensive on all things Arab and

G. Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

particularly on the time taken up during the day by religion and the attention to be paid to it. None of the educated women with whom I resided said prayers daily (see p. 140). The fact that they worked outside the home as school teachers, hospital or visiting nurses, was such a breach of the original Islamic pattern in which the exercise of religion in daily life demanded both time, place and attention which were difficult to reconcile with any kind of constant and effective work. My interpreter, a representative of the best-educated Kurdish women of the present time, had sacrificed her active participation in Islam's religious practices. However, by so doing, she lost the right and duty to break off from even the most pressing work in order to concentrate on spiritual matters. In consequence, some of the dignity of daily life disappeared, for quarrels and domestics are difficult when regularly broken by the necessity of prayer. If women are enrolled into an effective conveyor belt system outside the home, religion - and the peace of mind that goes with it - will be largely lost to them.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BASIS ON WHICH THE EMANCIPATION OF THE EUROPEAN WOMAN BEGAN AND THAT EXISTING IN MUSLIM AREAS

If we compare conditions in the West with those in Islamic areas the following differences are apparent:

When the women's emancipation movement began in Western society in the previous century, two models existed for women over a certain age: that of the wife and that of the old maid. Due to the fact that all women within a community like the Kurdish and other Muslim societies possessed the possibility of living the life of a normal woman—to be married and bear children—there has never been in Mohammedan countries a group of matrimonially-superfluous women, the type mainly behind the Women's movement in the West. Even today in Western communities the first thing noted about a woman—apart from the position she may personally have acquired—is whether she is married or not, Mrs. or Miss. From the point of view of career it has always been, and still is, in the Western world of greater advantage for a woman to enter marriage than it is for a man—quite contrary to conditions in Kurdistan. To remain unmarried in the Islamic world is, as maintained by several quarters[1], an impossibility, a view to which the Kurds subscribe. All a young man's energies are therefore concentrated on saving up money for a fitting bride price.

The difference in the view of the bride price as viewed from the outside world and as seen from inside—as this case in Egypt—is stressed by Crampton when she writes: "As a matter of fact there is a very close connection between the bride price given and the value ascribed to a woman. But while the Arabic women would consider it a shame and disparagement if nothing or too small a bride price

Q: Women E-5 (1997) 1961 MA11 Kurd MAU

were given, and while it is clear that the husband himself would look down upon such a wife, and that the public opinion would belittle her and therefore a high bride price is looked upon as a protection and a guarantee that a woman shall be honoured and well treated. Europeans have looked at the facts differently and said: so low is the position of the woman that she is bought. Now people among whom bride price is customary do not understand the Western ideal; their natural conclusion is that she is not thought to be worth a bride price. Here two completely different points of view clash and in each case only the objectionable in the opposite view is considered. It shows how much people's judgement depends on customs, which is no certain or absolute measure of value"[9].

What is now being offered the Muslim woman in various areas, and what will be offered the Kurdish woman sooner or later, is the abandonment of a protected and valued position; she will be asked to renounce being an essential link in a man's career, the only means whereby he can raise himself to the more socially-valued married state.

Instead she will obtain the partial equality we know in the West, in place of the clearly-stressed special position based on the difference of the sexes, she will acquire a partial equality with the opportunity to compete with men in all walks of life. At the same time her efforts in the sphere that have hitherto been reserved to her will be correspondingly less prized.

As the industrialisation of the country progresses, a large part of women's domestic activities will, as has happened in other countries, be transferred to trade with all its consequences, both good and bad. Her firmly-anchored culture pattern, sanctioned by religion, will collapse, though not by her wish, rather the reverse.

In the event of divorce and the adopting of monogamy, the stationary home that has so far existed for children will be dissolved. The solitary, divorced mother and the deserted unmarried mother will become social features to be incorporated into the community structure, as is about to be the case in our culture, where the number of solitary women has now reached such proportions that it can neither be overlooked nor concealed. The elderly will not obtain a place in the joint family, and the homes will no longer be able to afford protection to girls. The paramount demand concerning virginity is only logically justified provided a home exists where the girl can dwell, protected from the difficulties of life, and her parents— and not herself—arrange her marriage.

The older members of the family are deprived of the right and duty to plan the marriages of the young and thus extend their family connections with consequent improved security for the individual. The emotional choice of a married partner will become universal. As the young gradually take their fate into their own hands they will neglect their personal responsibility for their elders, which will be taken over by the State.

When saying that women are "emancipated" in Islamic areas when the veil, and what it stands for, is abolished, this change in her way of life cannot be compared with what happened to the Western woman when emancipated at the turn of the century. It is true that the life pattern of Islamic women

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

is being remodelled to resemble our own, but the structure of the pattern being transformed is not at all like the one that prevailed in the West when women's position was definitely improved.

What has been said will, perhaps, explain why difficulties arise when governments in Islamic areas decree that women are to be "liberated" and the veil abolished. That certain advantages accrue to the men by these changes is obvious, but the difficulties that have arisen suggest that the Islamic woman has to abandon more rights and advantages than has so far been made clear. Perhaps, then, this investigation into the life of the Kurdish woman as it is to-day—or rather, as it was in 1957—on the threshold of transformation, but still representing, if not a typically Islamic culture pattern, at least certain features that apply to other Islamic areas, may serve to cast light on the question.

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

majority of the population are Khanaqin, Kifri, Koi Sanjaq, Ruwandiz, Aqra, Amadiya, Dohuk and Zakho. Kirkuk city is very mixed but contains a large Kurdish element. The professional and intellectual classes, as well as the larger land-owners, tend, as would be expected, to collect in the towns, and there is always a steady drift of these out of Kurdistan to Baghdad.

The rural element consists for the most part of settled villagers; the nomads, once numerous, now form only a small proportion of the whole. Though not all villagers are in fact tribesmen, the organization of society outside the towns may be said, for all practical purposes, still to be essentially tribal, with groups of villages owing a kind of feudal allegiance to a landlord, a Shaykh of one of the dervish fraternities, or a tribal Agha who may have imposed himself on the village by force. With the progressive consolidation of the authority of the administration, and with the spread of education, the villagers have not unnaturally begun to refuse to submit to the impositions, sanctioned by ancient custom perhaps but not enforceable at law, by which these barons, especially the Aghas having no title to the land, were accustomed to maintain their position. In many parts of the country the old social organization is breaking down.

II.

The south-western boundary of Iraqi Kurdistan runs for most of its length across the plain. But immediately to the north-east of the line the ground begins to rise, first as a maze of foothills, and then in a series of long, parallel, limestone ridges running from south-east to north-west, each loftier than the last, up to the main chain of Zagros, which over much of its length marks the Persian frontier. In the extreme north-west these ranges merge into the eastern extension of the Taurus system. On the Persian frontier there are many peaks of over 10,000 feet. It follows that there is a great variety of climatic conditions. The country is traversed by three important affluents of the Tigris, the Great Zab from Turkey, and the Little Zab and the Sirwan (Diyala) from Persia.

A railway from Baghdad following closely the line of the old high road through Kifri and Kirkuk to Arbil serves Kurdistan south of the Great Zab; the main line up the right bank of the Tigris links Mosul directly with Baghdad and, as already mentioned, skirts the Kurdish districts of the extreme north-west. Most of the market towns are now accessible by automobile. Transportation in the remoter highlands and between villages is by mule and donkey; oxen are still used by the nomads as beasts of burden.

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

Insofar as these grievances had some foundation in fact enough has already been said to show that the prevailing state of affairs was due, in part at any rate, to political circumstances beyond the control of the government, and in part to the restlessness of the Kurds themselves which for long periods had brought the administration in a large part of Kurdistan to a standstill. Some of the neglect, too, was undoubtedly due not to malice but to a tendency, not unknown elsewhere, for the higher authorities to take more thought for the parts of the country near the center than for the distant outposts.

However that may be, the result was that just when the earlier agitators were developing into elder statesmen who, sobered by experience, no longer regarded separation as feasible or desirable there was growing up a new generation nurtured on a sense of grievance and frustration. Resentment was further embittered by insulting references to the minorities not infrequently made by pan-Arab orators in moments of fanatical exaltation. In all the countries of the Middle East the western Powers are regarded as the supporters of the old reactionary Beys and Pashas who have retained most of the political power in their own hands (the charge is unfair but it would prolong this paper unduly to examine it here). It is only to be expected, then, that disgruntled youth (and especially young Kurds with a racial added to a social grievance) should look to Russia for its inspiration. The Russians have long been the neighbours of the Kurds through the Caucasian provinces, and, as we have seen, a small part of Kurdistan lies within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Even before 1918 Kurdish malcontents in Turkey and Persia were accustomed to seek support from the Russians. For the Russians exploitation of Kurdish unrest would be nothing new, indeed something of the kind has been seen comparatively recently at the time of the short-lived 'Kurdish Republic' of Mahabad in Persian Kurdistan, and again in 1947 when Mulla Mustafa of Barzan, a fugitive rebel from Iraq, was welcomed in Soviet Armenia, given high military rank, and encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erivan.

But with every year that passes any concerted armed revolt becomes more improbable. The mercantile classes, realizing as they do that economically the Kurdish north is bound hand and foot to Baghdad, have never shown any enthusiasm for anything but the mildest form of nationalism, and the programme of development now in hand must have the effect of binding the whole country together more closely than ever before. The old loyalties to religious Shaykhs and tribal Aghas have been too deeply undermined for any self-appointed leader to command a serious measure of support in any violent adventure. The complexity of modern weapons has given the government an overwhelming advantage

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

over tribesmen armed only with rifles and limited supplies of ammunition, and, with the advent of aircraft and new types of mechanical transport suitable for rough country, even their former advantage of superior mobility has passed to the forces of law and order. In any case, those of the old stormy petrels who are still alive have been softened by a growing dependence on the amenities of the towns and on modern luxuries brought within reach by improved communications, while their sons, most of whom have been educated in government schools, are tending to become dependent, like the rest of the new middle class, on regular employment in the army, the civil service, or the professions. Nationalistic agitation might perhaps seek to profit from any agrarian unrest, but apart from this it is likely to express itself in little more than the clandestine circulation of leaflets by societies calling themselves 'communist' or occasional localized riots by students and bazaar loafers.

Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of the past, Iraq is the one country where the existence of the Kurds as such has come to be officially recognized. In Sulaimani and Arbil especially not only is Kurdish the official language but the whole atmosphere of the administration is Kurdish. The sense of being at the mercy of an uncomprehending bureaucracy in a distant capital has been mitigated by a recent measure of devolution applying to the whole country, the Provincial Administration Law, whereby funds are placed at the disposal of, or may be raised by, the local authorities to be spent in accordance with policies locally determined. In spite of earlier handicaps Kurds have risen to the highest offices. One of the intellectuals imprisoned in 1931 has since held the portfolio of Education, and all the necessary books for the primary classes are now available in good, idiomatic Kurdish. A son of Shaykh Mahmud and one of the Shaykh's principal lieutenants, an officer of great ability, have been Minister of Social Affairs in different Cabinets. For two or three years past the Minister of the Interior (a key office, second only to that of Prime Minister) and the *Mutasarrif* of Mosul (the senior provincial governorship) have been Kurds born and bred in Sulaimani. Fair numbers of students are now being sent to Europe and America. If there was ever any justification for the old fear that the Kurds of Iraq would look north or east for their salvation, there can be very little in it now. The present Prime Minister, General Nuri al-Sa'id, has a comprehending and liberal approach to the Kurdish question. It is still too early to say that all the old wounds have been healed, but there seems to be a new spirit abroad that augurs well for the future.

643 chard, 1949). The presence of the Jaf *Begzada* as political heads
642 necessarily affects the internal organization of the various Jaf *tiras*, and the segmentary nature of the lineage organization is therefore not expressed fully. Each *Raiz* becomes de-facto vested with some authority as the representative of the permanently established Jaf *Begzada*, and the political structure is thus actually a compromise between a truly segmentary lienage organization and a hierarchical organization.

642 As far as its formal structure goes, the Jaf confederacy seems extremely similar to the political system of the early Mongols, as described e. g. by Hudson: The prominence of Chengish Khan's lineage is phrased by him in terms of the vassalization of other descent groups, to emphasize that «all the subjects of the Khan were considered as the vassals not of the ruler but of his family and his close kinsmen as represented by him» (op. cit., p. 92). Essentially the same might well be said if the relation between the *tiras* of the Jaf confederacy and their *Begzada* lineage. It is interesting to speculate whether, since the political mechanism seems to be present, it was merely the difficulties of topography that prevented the Jaf and similar Kurdish confederacies from forming the larger units that one finds in the Central Asian steppe area.

642 The immediate modification in Jaf formal structure made necess-
621 ary by the adoption of sedentary life and agriculture are slight,
• 178 thought the meanings and importance attaching to the various aspects of the organization change radically. Generally, each *khel* settles in a part of the old *tira* pastures, and the informal head of the *khel* becomes the formally elected *kikha* (mayor or headman) of the resulting village. Any one *tira* thus tends to split up completely, some *khels* settling at the winter camp sites around Qizil Rubat, others 80 km. N.E. on the autumn campsites of Shahr-i-zur. Whereas tribal unity thus loses its significance, each village is registered as the property of one or another of the *Begzada*, and *Jaf* identification, as well as the acceptance of *Begzada* leadership, is natural.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE HAMAWAND.

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178 According to their own traditions, the Hamawands entered Southern Kurdistan from Persia as nomadic herdsmen. Seeing the opportunities offered by the ineffectual nature of Ottoman governmental control, they entered on a career of brigandage, looting the caravans that passed between Persia and Iraq. The uneasy relations between the Persian and Ottoman empires made this all the more feasable, since any activity detrimental to one power had the covert support of the other. Though the Hamawands later settled in villages, they did not immediately take up agriculture, except for small garden patches of melons etc. As they proudly assert: «For more than a generation we reaped our daily bread with our gunbarrels». All accounts by early travellers describe how this small group terrorized the district by striking quickly and effectively in widely separated areas. Only after the First World War did their economy become truly based on farming. Through this turbulent history, tribal political organization retained its importance, and some features of the system may be seen very clearly.

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642 The Hamawand group as a whole is regarded as one *tira* of the same magnitude as the various component Jaf *tiras*. Even in its greatest period of glory, the Hamawand *tira* could muster no more than 200-300 horsemen, implying a total population of 1,000-1,500 individuals. The process of branching has however been initiated; in fact, as compared to the Jaf, the Hamawand political structure seems to be based on a clearer political recognition of the segmentation into lineage sections which follows from the marriage pattern. The hierarchy of progressively more inclusive lineage segments, from the single village level (population 50—100) and up to the maximal lineage group, is given political significance.

642 There is no single leader of the whole Hamawand *tira*[1]); questions concerning the group as a whole are discussed and decided in a council made up of the *Aghas* (=headman) of the 4 primary branches. Each of these branches are again divided into sub-branches,

[1]) Actually, Mohammed Amin Agha of the *Begzada* claims paramount position.

642 554 the presumption that everything not legitimized in terms of the order is outside its scope». «So long as the encumbent of such a status does not act counter to the traditional order, ... loyalty is due, not to 'the order', but to him personally.» (Parsons, op. cit., p. 121).

The main contrast between the Kurdish systems and this «traditional» type lies in the implication in the definition of the latter that concrete traditional prescriptions are indeed accepted and agreed upon by all. The cultural heterogeneity of the South Kurdish area has been emphasized above; this heterogeneity makes for a situation where a truly traditional system can not operate. Any single concrete traditional prescription tends to be questioned by all but a minority, and conflicting interpretations of what is in fact the traditional order are constantly advanced. As a result, the theme of *power* attains an overriding importance, following the line of reasoning that if you can get away with something, it can't be very wrong. The effective check on excesses in the use of power is the threat of murder. Though there is obviously much more excited talk than 631 action, Kurds are rightly famous for being «trigger-happy», and a person who strongly feels that his rights have been infringed upon may go to great lengths to retaliate. Since no institutional means exist, violence has become institutionalised as the only mechanism at hand.

178 642 It is tempting to see the present situation as the result of breakdown of a formerly functioning traditional system. There is considerable evidence indicating that Southern Kurdistan some 100 years ago was better integrated than today, in the form of a strongly 175 feudal Pashalik centering around Suleimani. The Baban Pashas of 642 Suleimani had frequent opportunities during conflicts with both the Persian and the Ottoman rulers to show that they had the unquestioning support of an overriding majority of the population, and through several centuries of rule they built up a traditional hierarchy of hereditary status positions, entitling persons to political offices (Rich op. cit., p. 115). The traditional nature of the rule is strikingly brought out in the following citation, where the Pasha of Suleimani explains the solidarity that his subjects feel towards him by contrast-

the tribal leader retains longest in the face of breakdown of tribal organization (cf. Memni, p. 126). The ability to avoid or resolve such conflicts between villages is a prerequisite for the maintenance of lineage unity, and it is therefore essential that the principle of collective responsibility is *not* applied to the co-residents of the village community.

Leach (op. cit., pp. 56-7) discusses a feud between two competing lineages in the Rowanduz area. Though in effect a struggle for political supremacy between rival lineages, it appears to be governed by ideas of retaliation and equality. Hay (op. cit.) further lists the traditionally stipulated blood money to be paid for various classes of people. The Rowanduz area, as contrasted to Southern Kurdistan, is one where a number of well-organized lineages are in close contact. This is due in part to a difference in local history. Suleimani is an old center, and the whole territory was long subject to the feudal Baban administration, based on non-lineage principles. The Rowanduz mountain areas, on the other hand, retained a presumably characteristic tribal organization, with numerous territorially separate, independent lineages till quite late, when it was united by conquest in a larger state system under the Mir og Rowanduz around 1830. It is interesting to speculate whether the fusion of numerous lineages into a larger state may not have changed some of the factors outlined above in such a way as to permit the institutionalized extension of the South Kurdish pattern of personal revenge to a pattern of blood feud.

In Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to see what sanctions would be brought to bear against homicide within the maximal lineage, other than this pattern of personal revenge. Other mechanisms, once existing, may however have been disguised by now through the activities of the external administration.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Chapter VII.

The detribalization process.

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In the same way as certain part-statuses are incompatible with others in combination in a single person, certain of these statuses are incompatible in a single village community. Where two part-status positions imply conflicting interests in the same field of activity, the part-status that controls most de-facto power will dominate the scene, and sooner or later replace the other or re-define its field of relevance. A unified discussion of these aspects of incompatibility should contribute to our understanding of social change in the South Kurdish countryside.

The mechanics of such redefinition and replacement of part-status categories should be clear from the previous discussion. From the supra-village level, a new factor is introduced, modifying the power or prestige connected with a certain part-status position — e. g. the introduction of a civil code that robs the *mullah* of much of his power, a serious defeat reduces the prestige of a previously dominant *tira*, or land registration settles property disputes in the favor of certain persons. The individual occupying a relative position in the total hierarchy of supra- and sub-ordination may then find one of two things to have happened: (a) his power, and thus his de-facto position in the hierarchy, has been modified, in which case a fluid adjustment and transfer of loyalties will tend to follow in the village community, or (b) his de-facto power, in itself unchanged, is in time modified by changes in the relative prestige attached to his

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

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part-status — his ability to *rally* persons is improved or impaired, with direct results on his position in the power hierarchy. Either or both of these reactions may result — i. e. primary changes in either or both the de-facto (a) and the «ideal» (b) hierarchy may be produced. In certain cases the change produced by the same factor in these two hierarchies may be in contradiction, and the final adjustment is then dependent on the degree of external interference.

The patterns of these reactions and changes are set by the precedence of loyalties in conflict situations, crudely sketched above. It should then be theoretically possible to correlate the nature and form of social change in Southern Kurdistan with the factors. The assumption is generally, and I think legitimately, made that all non-tribal groups of Kurds are ultimately to be derived from one or more tribal groups. At present, at any rate, the direction of change between the two poles, from *tribal* to non-tribal or *feudal*, is very evident, and some of the factors resulting in such a detribalization process clearly follow from the above discussion. There is further considerable indication that only the two poles themselves, described as *tribal* and *feudal*, are moderately stable, and that change from the one to the other, once initiated, is a moderately rapid process. This is e. g. indicated by the numerical preponderance of villages of the polar types as compared to intermediary types. It also follows logically from the concept of incompatibilty of certain part-statuses in a single village: many of the tribal and non-tribal formal categories or part-statuses overlap in their fields of relevance, and this results in competition, and elimination or re-definition, where they are combined in one local community. Once the process of un-ravelling is under way, the complete set of non-tribal categories will thus tend to replace its tribal counterparts.

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Probably the most potent agents of social change, with a very direct relation to the power hierarchy in the village, are changes in the pattern of land tenure. Ottoman land codes and taxation policy, corrupt administration, and the increasing emphasis in Kurdish culture on leisure and real property have all encouraged the concentration of land in few hands, and the establishment of feudal patterns of delegation of usifruct rights on land. The resulting class hierarchy

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

laborer-tenant-intermediary-absentee landowner, differs radically from that generally associated with tribal organization, which includes relatively few laborers and/or *Meskjin*, and a majority of freeholding farmers.

The incompatibility of categories from these two class hierarchies is evident, as is the tendency for the hierarchy embodying most power — i. e. the more highly centralized organization headed by the landowner — to replace the other. The absentee landowner who owns only part of the land of a village, will find his powers greatly impaired by the co-existance of freeholding farmers with his tenants in the local community. The sanctions by which he disciplines his tenants are reduced in effect — eviction from land is less serious, eviction from the village dependent on the vote of villagers outside his control. Similarly, he would be limited in his freedom to settle new farmers on the land by a veto on the part of the freeholding farmers, who could refuse the newcomer village membership. The village headman would almost certainly be elected from among the freeholding farmers, and serve as a coordinator of opposition to the landowner, etc. etc. The landowner, occupying the part-status that embodies most power in this situation of conflicting interests will tend to apply his powers to eliminate the incompatible status category — in this case by buying or forcibly taking over the proprietary rights on the remaining land, and giving the formerly freeholding farmers tenant status.

Where the right to eviction, and in fact the final powers of decision in all village matters, are taken away from the formerly freeholding farmer group, it becomes impossible for it to control a class of *Meskjin* serfs, and this status group is similarly eliminated, and presumably assimilated as tenant farmers of lower status, following from their lower wealth.

A second major agent of change, or at times a concomitant of these economic changes, is the factor of modification of the administrative system by external administration. The tribal administrative mechanism, based on «unquestioned» kinship-patterned loyalties, has been discussed above (pp. 69 ff). Where external administration — large absentee landowner or central government alike — enters and

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

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enforces its decisions by coercive means, the pattern of tribal administration breaks down, and a transfer of loyalties will tend to result — e. g. as in the case of the Memni *tira*, cf. p. 126.

At the time of the Baban Pashalik, the capitalist landowner was of less importance, and external administration was along traditional lines. The Baban Pashas utilized the principles of indirect rule, essential in the application of a feudal system to an area of ethnic mixture. Though external administration thus was a less active agent in producing detribalization, it was stil operative. The Baban Pashas lent power to the traditional leaders in their hierarchy, and supported many of their decisions by coercive means. In the nomadic groups, this was less necessary, since the necessity and functions of an organizing leader are obvious to all members of the community. In the settled communities, the need for a coordinator is less obvious to the individual member of the group, and the leader's authority will be more readily questioned. Either a constant process of segmentation must be operative, as among the Hamawands, or the «kinship head» type of leader can not retain control. External administration, however, has vested interests in retaining status quo and avoiding conflicts, and therefore applies its powers to resist fission of groups. Thus the close kinship unity of the local group is lost, and tribal organization is weakened. At the same time, external administration wishes to have a clear and moderately constant leader to deal with, and will thus attempt to strengthen the power of the leader and stabilize his position, to counteract these disorganizing tendencies. Thus it becomes necessary to vest the leader with coercive means, and this leads to the complete breakdown of the traditional tribal lineage organization.

The predominance of non-tribal communities in the area under closest Baban control must be seen as the cumulative effect of centuries of centralized rule, where such factors would be operative. It should also be remembered that any movement of people — except where it occurs in larger blocks — alienates the migrant from his hereditary *tira* group, and places him in a non-tribal system of administration wherever he choses to settle, since there is no mechanism by which he may be adopted into a new lineage.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Thus a fairly clear dichotomy can be made in Kurdish territory between tribal areas, in which lineages form the bases for the political structures, and lineage groups correspond directly to territorial groups, and on the other hand non-tribal areas, where the territorial group forms the sole basis of organization in a semi-feudal system, and, though descent and kinship are important, any type of lineage organization is absent.

Though this change from tribal to non-tribal organization seems, as far as any specific community is concerned, to be a road of no return, and there has been a constant detribalization process going on through time, the actual border between the areas where tribal vs. feudal organizations predominate has remained moderately constant for many generations, with apparently only minor ossilations. This must be seen as a steady state, where the rate of population movement — in tribal blocks or segments of such — from the mountains towards and into the plains roughly compensated for the formerly slow rate of breakdown in tribal organization along the zone of contact with external administration.

This rough balance has been completely upset by the changes following the First World War. The rate of detribalization has been tremendously speeded up by modern communications, reaching into the mountain fastness and most distant valleys; external administration has pacified all the old tribal strongholds; and movements of groups across the border from Persia are prevented or at least seriously hampered. It is thus only a question of time, probably less than a generation, till the segmentary lineage type of tribal organization is completely replaced by the non-tribal type in Southern Kurdistan.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Chapter VIII.

Conclusion

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The types of Kurdish social organization described above seem, even apart from their local cultural dress, somewhat different from those usually reported by anthropologists. Especially the combination in the «tribal» organization of a lineage system, close family endogamy, and a kinship terminology without unilineal emphasis poses some interesting problems.

It has been suggested (e. g. Murdock 1949, p. 234) that this Kurdish situation reflects the breakdown of a previous organization based on exogamous sib groups, following the introduction of Islam, with the Koranic permission, or even encouragement, to marry close kin. Clearly, this explanation is not sufficient, considering how fundamental the pattern seems in the Kurdish tribal organization, and the unusually high incidence of FaBrDa marriage as compared to other Moslem communities.

As far as the historical and comparative material goes, there is little reason to believe that the tendency towards close family endogamy is an Islamic innovation in the area. In appraising the historical material, it is important, as Luzbetak (1951) emphasizes, to distinguish between (a) classical centers of endogamy with examples of brother-sister marriage in royal lineages (Egypt, Sumer, Elam, Arabia, Persia), connected with a tremendous elaboration and emphasis on hereditary prestige, and (b) areas where close family endogamy was a basic feature of the social organization, and operated

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

on a village level. Eliminating the cases of type (a), there is still ample evidence of endogamous patterns of non-Islamic or pre-Islamic origin, especially in the Caucasus-Armenian area, of which the Kurdish mountains are geographically an extension. The customary law of Daghestan prescribes close kin marriage, and explicitly forbids the marriage with an outsider (ibid). The early ecclasiastical laws of Armenia attack next-of-kin marriages with great vehemence (ibid, p. 54), and such practices caused great concern among the early Christian missionaries, till they were eventually rooted out. Thus, rather than regard the Kurdish combination of patterns as a labile state produced by cross-cultural mixture, it would seem reasonable to grant the Kurdish «tribal» organization considerable antiquity as a stable variant or *type* of lineage organization, of some theoretical interest.

On a structural level, it can be argued that a pattern of FaBrDa marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system. Solidarity to the patrilineal descent group in abstracto is minimal. Close family endogamy results in a direct correspondance between lineage segments and local groups, giving the descent groups a clear territorial framework in which the lineage organization can function. On the individual level, a man's political position and power depends in the last instance on the number of riflemen he can muster. However, only co-lineage males can be expected to give such political support. A pattern of FaBrDa marriage contributes to prevent alienation of immediate collateral lines, and re-affirms the old man's leading position in relation to his agnatic nephews, thereby vesting him with control over a larger agnatic group of males.

Where the lineage is found in other areas as a corporate group, it is usually connected with a kinship terminology of the «lineage» type, which, through unilineal emphasis and classificatory extensions contributes in defining and delimiting these corporate groups. Kurdish kinship terms, on the other hand, are purely «descriptive» in that they measure geneological distance between near kin. Nor do they show any unilineal emphasis. In other words, they do not contribute in any way to the definition of unilineal corporate groups. However, when this terminology is seen in combination with the

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

not be underestimated. The consumption of sugar, tea and coffee is to a large extent confined to the Guest House and it is important to recognise that these are the principle items of ordinary consumption that have to be paid for in cash. *In the simple foods, wheat, rice, meat, fruits, etc. each small community can be largely self supporting: it is only the luxury foodstuffs associated with the Guest House which have to be paid for in cash. The effect of this upon the general economic organisation will be discussed presently. 262 511

Meanwhile it should be noted again how closely linked from the Kurdish viewpoint is the upkeep of the Guest House and the upkeep of the Aghas household in general. This attitude is not so inconsistent as at first appears. Although the womenfolk never appear in the Guest House, it is they who do all the work connected with it. It is the women who milk the goats and prepare the mast (a milk product similar to yaghourt), it is the women who make the bread and do all the cooking - and all this is work for several pairs of hands. In the commoner's house one wife alone can readily enough accomplish all the work required of her, but the hospitality undertaken by an Agha in his Guest House involves the work of a number of women, and this is consistent with the fact that the Agha's household is normally the only polygynous group in the community. 462 532

A further point to be noted in this connection is that not only does the Agha's household include an abnormal proportion of women, but that the upkeep of these women is much more expensive than the average. In the Balik area nearly all the males have their clothes made from locally woven cloth; even the Aghas and their sons, though employing better quality materials than the commoner, stick mainly to Kurdish cloth and eschew the fancy clothing adopted by townsfolk and the Aghas of the plain. This appears to be due to their severely puritan tastes rather than to economic necessity. A nephew of the Agha of Bayat was seen wearing a suit of ordinary Kurdish style but made of obviously expensive imported cloth in plain bright colours, - this was much admired; but at the same time a trader from Rowanduz, who was wearing a rig out of the cheap gaudily striped Japanese cloth typical of Near Eastern Bazaars, was held up to ridicule as a man of no taste. Anyway, as the conventions are at present, neither the commoner nor the Agha incurs much cash expenditure in connection with his own clothes; but for the womenfolk it is different. In the old days they too were well satisfied with the simple cloths produced on the local looms, but now more and more they are becoming eager for "frills and furbelows" - Japanese cotton prints for the commoners, Indian silks for the wives of Aghas. In part this is the inevitable result of the greater facilities for trading contact brought about by 'pacification' and the building of the road, but the tendency was undoubtedly accelerated by the [illegible] after the Great War 291 [n8]

* The more important Aghas often import extra supplies of rice so as to avoid giving their guests the inferior rice substitute sama (see later).

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

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000 the policy of the Administration after the Great War.

511 Formerly the village communities were, within the limits of a somewhat meagre standard of living, virtually self supporting. Trade
• 178 and currency circulation were both minimal. *The British Administra-
484 tion's policy of buying the loyalty of the tribal chiefs by means of a cash salary resulted in there being available within the community substantial amounts of currency for which there was no immediate outlet except in the purchase of luxuries. Moreover this wealth was not distributed evenly throughout the community but concentrated into the hands of a few leading Aghas. The result has many analogies with similar phenomena observed in Africa. The preliminary expenditure creates a sudden taste for luxuries within a small segment of the community. These new wants develop both in scope and intensity out of all proportion to the ability of the community to satisfy them, with the inevitable result that the economic balance of the community is upset and the originally wealthy group, by developing expensive tastes, becomes eventually an economic drain upon the community. The process can indeed be expressed in general economic terms applicable even to the conditions of our own society.

Expenditure by the Government can for a time create a new large effective demand, but when this expenditure ceases and the income of the community drops the newly created wants remain unsatisfied. The result is not a reversion to the original situation but an adaptation of it, in which the available income is allocated to new ends in an attempt to give partial satisfaction to the newly created wants.

There can be no doubt that in the Balik country, under the influence of the Government subsidy, the tastes of the more important Aghas and their households developed a high degree of sophistication without any corresponding improvement in the productivity of the community as a whole. With the establishment of effective police authority in the Rowanduz valley the subsidy to the tribal leaders was suspended as being unnecessary. The consequences were inevitable. The foreign clothing and house furnishings which had formerly been mere luxuries had by this time developed into essential necessaries. Today the more sophisticated Aghas such as Sheikh Mohammad of Walash and Hamid Amin of Dergala are feeling the pinch severely. They will tell you that times are hard and that they can no longer afford to maintain the standard they were accustomed to in the days of their youth, but the truth rather would seem to be that they are vainly trying to maintain a much "higher" standard than was ever thought of

* It is difficult to obtain from Kurdish sources reliable information of the sums involved. Sheikh Mohammad's son assured me that at one time his father possessed over £3,000 in gold and specie. At the present time he appears to be in debt to merchants and moneylenders.

in older times, and that the economy of the village will not stand the strain.

Much point is lent to this by the fact that Ali Agha of Sapni (head of the Shevdini), who being a nominal subordinate of Sheikh Mohammad received no Government subsidy, has remained a simple tribesman with few tendencies towards sophistication. Moreover, far from lamenting the new order he seems to find the present times extremely prosperous and is eagerly pressing his claims with the Government to have the Shevdini land registered in his own name, so that he can establish his people's claim to be an subject in their own right instead of merely a tribe of the Balik. It seems significant too that the Shevdini, who alone have never had to undergo the economic shock of temporary Government support, appear to be today much the most integrated group in the sociological sense.

One further generalisation emerges from this analysis. We noted earlier that of the food consumed by the village, the only items that must be purchased by cash are sugar, tea, coffee and in some cases rice. We noted further that practically the whole of this expenditure was incurred by the Agha in connection with the maintenance of the Guest House and his own household. Now from our analysis of other forms of cash expenditure we see that these too fall almost exclusively on the Agha's section of the community. His cash expenditure thus differs from that of the commoner not only in volume but also very largely in kind. This distortion has important bearings for our further analysis.

Economic Balance of the Village Community

Of the various village groups in the area here described it is scarcely possible to select any single community as typical, so far as agricultural production is concerned. While all the groups are interested in approximately the same range of products, what might be called the 'emphasis of production' varies considerably. One village may specialise in fruit growing, another in wheat, another in tobacco and so on. This differentiation arises partly from geographical considerations - such as altitude, water supply, soil fertility - and partly from the conservative prejudices of the Aghas concerned. Owing to the increased trading contacts opened up since the coming of the road, and the need to satisfy newly developed wants for imported "luxury" goods the whole structure of the economic organisation of these hill people is undergoing very rapid change and readjustment. The individual variations as between different villages at the present time depend in the main upon the degree to which this readjustment to changed external circumstances has already taken place. It should be borne in mind therefore that the synthetic account of this process of change in the following few pages, though valid in general terms if applied to the district as a whole, is not necessarily applicable to any single village community.

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[illegible] chieftainship it was alleged that he corrupted the villagers with alcohol and gambling and attempted to seduce their daughters, in particular the Bella's daughters, in fact he was altogether a scoundrel. In the course he was fined in the high court with two bullocks through his help. The police took action. Two hundred looking camels from another tribe were brought before the courts and on the basis of somewhat elaborate circumstantial evidence convicted of murder. Between lawyers and [illegible] were carried out since the "principals" eventually disappeared a few days after the trial. Whatever was the truth of this matter, local opinion had no doubts on the subject. The bullet wounds, the arrest and conviction of the camels were all a frame up by the police, who had the whole act to fish in troubled waters. The sentence was but really died of strangulation - imagine in the dark house of Sheikh Mohamed, Agha of Bulsah and chief of the Bella.

This story was told me by Basil Asia of Zeila who was always eager to start a chat on his cousin Sheikh Mohamed. It appeared however to have some general necessary since, when I was discussing the circumstances of the local administration with the Agha of Zeila, he referred to the Sheikh story. "Those small Government servants! What do you expect? They're all scoundrels".

Whether the story is true or not is irrelevant, the effect among the Bella is the same as if it had been true. Even though Sheikh Mohamed's prestige is not as great as formerly, the fact, or even the rumour, that he had to keep his first and only agricultural advance is a sufficient deterrent for any farmer (when one may be contemplating [illegible] who fears their own competitors. This example [illegible] not will have a [illegible] practice be affected by a mass of seemingly irrelevant considerations in the field of ethics, tribal law, politics and religion.

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To sum up then. We have seen how the necessity for developing an export trade implies the necessity for increasing the tobacco acreage at the expense of cereal acreage, and I have tried to analyse out the forces of resistance which serve to prevent any immediate response to this invention. Nevertheless the invention is clearly very great. I was told for instance in Zeila that whereas in the old days the crops of the entire village had been worth barely £50 in cash, the tobacco sales in 1937 alone totalled £2,500. I believe therefore that in the hills also some radical alteration in the emphasis of agriculture must take place in the near future.

But it must be recognised that any such development must bring about fundamental changes both in the ideology of the people and of their social organisation. As things are, the hill country farmer sets out first of all to grow sufficient food for himself and his family. Only when he is assured of that does he turn his attention to the cultivation of luxury products such as tobacco. In short he aims at

8: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
Rowanduz

being self sufficient in his production, trading only that which is surplus to his requirements. Under the new conditions the local production of cereals will be inadequate and the difference will have to be made up by trading tobacco for wheat. Thus for the first time the ordinary commoner will be forced to evaluate his lands foodstuffs in terms of a cash economy - and this may have serious consequences. Under present conditions tobacco is so enormously valuable (in terms of cash) compared with any other British production that some well favoured villages may come to rely on this crop to the exclusion of all others, thus making the welfare of the community dependent upon fluctuations in the price of tobacco on the Baghdad market, - hardly a desirable development.

The social consequences of an increase in tobacco cultivation may be equally drastic. Consider for instance the matter of rents. In a previous section I have suggested that the commoner normally pays his Agha 50% of the yield of his lands and this is eminently no great hardship since the commoner family lives satisfactorily on the remaining 50%. However in terms of cash the rental does not represent very much - at 1938 prices, a ton of wheat would purchase locally only just over 50 kilos of sugar. But under the new system not only will the commoner be unable to satisfy his own food requirements without resort to trade, but a 50% rental would, relatively [illegible] with the added consequence that the commoner who trades tobacco will for the first time find himself under a direct tax obligation to the Government. There is little doubt that in such circumstances 'rents' would be reduced. In my view the general levelling up of financial status as between commoner and Agha which would result from this process would be entirely fatal to the existing tribal organisation.

On the analogy with the Lorimer areas the ultimate line of evolution is indeed clear. The Agha finds it increasingly difficult to maintain his obligations of kinship and hospitality; he falls into debt and eventually by some trick of the law the tribal land is mortgaged to pay the bill. Thereafter the new Agha is merely a landlord with no personal ties with the community - the process of tribal dissolution may to all intents and purposes be regarded as complete.

From the Government's point of view such a development is not entirely undesirable. A completely detribalised community is in many respects easier to administer than a tribal one, at least in the short term view. And there are still wider factors affecting the situation. The labour for the Kirkuk oil fields is largely supplied

* This is theoretically impossible, since by Iraq definition tribal land is shirk land. Nevertheless the process of alienation has in the past clearly taken place in the plains and foothill areas.

8: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
Rowanduz

per inch; while a good quality coloured cloth such as worn by Ajhar has
286 forty six Reds 36 threads per inch.

As mentioned already the village weaver, where there is one, now
has to face serious competition not only from the cloth dealers of the
town but also from certain large scale weaving concerns in Rowanduz and
• 178 Erbil. The latter still use the ordinary Scottish looms but seem to be
286 able to produce a better quality product than the village craftsmen.
The difference may be due to the fact that the town craftsmen uses a
mechanically spun thread, whereas the village weaver in the main works
with a hand spun article. But there is no definite tradition that the
town made material is superior. The clothes worn by the Mir while I
was in Jezgala had been made from local cloth, his son Jalal, on the
other hand, had purchased the stuff for his new blue trousers in
Rowanduz. My impression is however that with the ever increasing
facilities for contact with tradure from the town the functions of the
village weaver will soon become superfluous and the community will
become completely dependent upon outside sources in yet one further
respect.

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lead to one side burning the other's crops or stealing their cattle. Until bloodshed has occurred nothing is serious and a good clan Aghe will see to it that the parties submit to arbitration before the affair reaches a crisis. Here serious are affairs in which women are involved; an insult to honour can only be wiped out by death and the discovery of adultery can have only one possible sequel. Such cases however need not necessarily lead to feud; if the guilty lover belongs to the same village as the injured husband a single murder is considered to settle the matter. If the parties are from different groups however the affair is much more serious and several assassinations may take place before settlement can be reached. Eventually, provided it is the honour of commoners rather than of Aghas that is at stake, the Aghas concerned will arrange feud through the mediation of the tribal chiefs. According to Say "A blood feud is usually settled by the payment of blood-money; every condition of man or woman has its or her price, and even the parts of the body are catalogued. A Ramandi or middle class Bradost farmer is valued at £50, one of his women at £25, and his leg or weight say £20. Such payment is often made in kind, some cattle or a horse, or so much wheat being handed over to the aggrieved party. It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in payment of blood money. Thus if £50 were owing, the price of the blood of one man or the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three cows and a donkey". I have no comparable information, though I think the general principle is accurately described. In Say's time the Government could seldom apprehend a murderer. He says "For the murdered man's relations to take their revenge is quite in order, but an execution at the hands of that murder, the Government, is an entirely different matter. The culprit therefore is carefully concealed until he can make good his escape to the hills". The position today is somewhat different and I fancy the murderer is usually caught. This however does not end the feud; blood feud murders are punishable only by two years imprisonment and the war starts again when the culprit gets free.*

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As has been explained the feuds of commoners and the less important Aghas are settled in the end by tribal arbitration. However

* The Administration makes a distinction between feud murders justified by tribal custom and ordinary murders which are not. The former come under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two years imprisonment; the latter come under the ordinary Iraq criminal code for which the penalty is much more severe (? death). This has led to interesting repercussions. In the old days by tribal custom an affair of honour was adequately settled if the man only was killed, the woman in the case being merely driven out of her own community to fend for herself. Today it is necessary for the avenging husband to prove to the Authorities that it is really an affair of honour and not just a cold blooded murder. The custom now therefore is to kill both the guilty parties.

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10:Johnson G-2 (no date) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Iraq

361 Sulaimaniya is the chief town in Iraqi
369 Kurdistan, in that it is the largest town in the Kurdish area whose population is entirely Kurdish. Other towns exist in Iraqi Kurdistan, but the larger ones—Kirkuk, Erbil and Kifri—are inhabited by as many Turcomans as Kurds, although the tribes around are Kurdish. Kurds are essentially shepherds of the mountains, and do not take easily to the life of a townsman.

175 In this they resemble their distant
• 198 relatives the Pathans of Afghanistan and north-western India, who, in the early migrations of Aryan-speaking peoples, penetrated into the highlands east of the Persian plateau while the Kurds spread westwards into what is now north-western Iran, eastern Turkey and north-eastern Iraq. Here, in secluded mountain valleys, they preserved many ancient characteristics which their fellow migrants, settling

[p. 389(B)]

10:Johnson G-3 (no date) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Iraq

175 in the Persian plains, lost through contact
178 with the outside world. By the time recorded history begins, Kurds and Persians were already recognized as distinct peoples, the former being known as Medes.

[101]

792 Some 600 years before the birth of
771 Christ and 1200 before the spread of Islam, a Kurdish prophet, Zerdusht (Zoroaster), grew up among the mountains of the Azerbaijan district near the Caspian Sea. The gospel that he preached, in its primitive and simple form, is to a greater extent the basis of Christianity and Islam than the adherents of those world religions usually admit. The Kurd of today, however, knows nothing of this. He is nominally a Mohammedan, and has even on occasions been stirred by the call of "*Jihad*"—the holy war—in the name of Islam. But beneath the surface there lurk some curious remnants of Zoroastrian tradition.

[A 383 (c)]

22/ natural one. The Kurdish shepherd moves through lands where cereals and vegetables can be grown: barley, wheat, maize, rice, melons and tomatoes are among the crops cultivated in various parts; so the tendency is for the nomad to become semi-nomadic.

This is the term applied to tribes which have built villages in the lower ground into which they retire with their flocks and herds during the severity of the winter. The live-stock are normally crowded into a semi-basement below the living quarters. In the spring, when the grazing near at hand is used up, a portion of the tribe takes the flocks to the highlands, living in the usual black tents of the nomads, while certain members of each tribe remain in the village attending to the crops. Some tribes vacate their villages completely. The family goods and chattels are loaded onto the backs of oxen, donkeys or mules, and nothing is left behind except the four stone walls and mud roofs of the houses.

22/ A number of Kurdish tribes in Iraq,
• 178 however, are still entirely nomadic; these include various sections of the Jaf, Herki and other tribes. At the other end of the scale are the 'settled' Kurds, who live in villages in one locality throughout the year. Settled Kurds already outnumber the nomadic Kurds of Iraq, and for several reasons the tendency is for their numbers to increase further.

The first and most important is that in the case of most of the nomadic tribes the mountains of Iraq have been their winter habitat in the past, while for summer grazing they used the fertile slopes of the

[50-c]

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• 178 higher mountains over the Turkish or Iranian border. With the spread of bureaucratic administration in these countries—especially in Iran—the frontiers have been closed to the passage of nomadic tribes by the imposition of taxes and conditions with which the tribesman cannot economically comply; so he has perforce to give up his summer highlands. Instead he has to use the border districts of Iraq which he formerly passed through in the spring and autumn. But here again the Iraq government policy is to settle the tribes where possible, owing to the difficulty of effective administrative control over nomads and the difficulty of bringing them within the influence of the government's educational and social policies.

000 The 'settling of the tribes' is distasteful to anyone who has lived among them and learned to appreciate the healthy care-free

[51 D]

14¢ Ivanov 8-5 (no date) 1926 MAI Rec MAI

The following list gives an approximate idea as to the present principal sub-divisions of the Kurdish-speaking tribes; they are mentioned in order from north to south, and according to the area which they inhabit:

1. Melanlu, in Qubbkhaneh, the northern part of the districts of Isfarain, Juwain, and the extreme north of Nishapur.
2. Bajgiranlu, a small sub-tribe, living near Bajgiran.
3. Aghanlu, near Aghach and along the frontier.
4. Hiwalanlu, near Quchan, and in Darreh Gaz.
5. Qaramanlu, near Nawukh, Dizawan, etc.
6. Shadilu, in Bujnurd, etc., mostly speaking Turkish only.
7. Za'faranlu, in Shirwan, have now lost their former importance; very few speak Kurdish.
8. Kuraulu, north of Quchan.*
9. Mashkanlu, near Mashkan, in the district of Quchan.
10. Burji, *ibid.*, near Radgan.
11. Kalwanlu, *ibid.*, in Juwain and in the northern parts of the Nishapur district.
12. Mashdakanlu, in northern part of Nishapur and the Quchan districts.

All these tribes represent forms of transition between pure nomads and the ordinary peasant. Many of them are half-nomads, *i.e.* they cultivate fields in the summer and are nomads in the winter, when they shift to some warmer district. It is specific that the transition from the nomadic to the settled life is very gradual, and that it is going on in every tribe.

Some other tribes consist chiefly of nomads, such as the following:

13. Rashanlu, in Khakistar, Lain, near Kashkha.
14. Brivanlu, near Kashkha, and in the summer in Kelat.
15. Hashtalanlu, Darreh Gaz in the winter and Quchan valley in the summer.
16. Badivanlu, in the same places.
17. Jafkanlu, in the winter at Chamakalur and in the summer at Kuh-i-Dunbat.†
18. Karamanlu, in the northern parts of the Nishapur districts.
19. Waranlu, a small tribe in the same place.
20. Tupkanlu, in the district of Juwain, partly in Nishapur; in the winter they migrate to the Dasht-i-Tayi.‡
21. 'Amarlu, north-west from Nishapur, in and around the village of Marunbi (also called Marunb).

* Their name resembles the Gurans of Kurdistan proper, and the connection is quite probable.

† These may be connected with a western Kurdish tribe of Jaf, who are very numerous along the Mesopotamian frontier.

‡ Their migrations extend over a very long distance, taking weeks for a journey with their live-stock. It is remarkable that their passage is never accompanied with any accident or robbery.